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Electing Justice Book Review
Tim Taylor
rofessor Richard Davis's book Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process leaves
its readers informed, frustrated, and overwhelmingly
surprised by the all-too political process surrounding the
nomination and confirmation of Supreme Court Justices.
The book is great history, unfurling the progression of
court appointments from staid congressional duty to media frenzy with a good, if not excellent, balance of narrative, analysis, and anecdote. While the crux of Davis's
response to the politicization of judicial nomination-that
we should elect the Supreme Court Justices-may sound
radical at first glance, his actual proposal is nuanced and
(dare I say it?) practicable. Not all readers will be convinced that American citizens ought to elect justices, but
the book's argument is refreshing and admirably serious.

P

Summary
The book's introduction, and best section, is a frustrating position paper. Here, Davis unapologetically makes
his case:
Particularly in the last quarter century or so, we have
transformed the judicial selection process into one with
all of the trappings of an electoral campaign but without
the key players-the electorate. This is an untenable
situation-a reality that looks only vaguely familiar
to the formal structure designed for it more than 200
years ago and a process that no longer reflects reality. I
I say this chapter is frustrating because we do not want
to believe what he has to say, but the evidence he provides is convincing. He begins by dispelling the myth
that judicial nominees are selected for their merit alone.
While competence matters, a plethora of senators have
expressed that candidates with philosophies far from the
Senate's philosophy will "be in for a rough ride."c Thus,

it is important for presidents to "sell" their nominees; in
response to the president's salesmanship, forces both for
and against the nominee mobilize in hopes of influencing
the Senate. However, the power of these forces-the media, interest groups, and public opinion-has multiplied
in the last fifty years. These external players, who are not
constitutionally enumerated, are here to stay, and the judicial selection process must be restructured to adapt to
this new reality, says Davis. The battles waged over the
confirmations of Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito
prove Davis correct: the process is political, and external
forces are not only refusing to disappear, but growing in
strength. For idealists of the judicial branch these revelations are, indeed, frustrating.
The book's first full chapter, "Traditional Versus New
Players," details the constitutional and extra-constitutional
roles of each branch of government in the judicial process
and also the rise of new players: interest groups, the news
media, and public opinion. For a presidency, a Supreme
Court nomination has far-reaching ramifications: nominees
may shift the court right or left, boost a president's image
among moderates or his core constituency, and serve as
a barometer of the relative strength of the presidency
to the Senate. As for the Senate, its pendulum between
quiescence and assertiveness currently swings towards
assertion. Even so, senators must take pains to avoid
appearing either belligerent or political. Finally, the
judiciary affects the process through timed retirements and
their activity on the bench. Beyond these constitutional
forces, new actors are affecting the selection process,
and they are doing so strongly and on every nomination,
rather than just occasionally. Unlike in the past, nominees
are now subjected to extensive scrutiny of both their
professional and private lives. Interest groups lobby both
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for and against nominees on strictly ideological grounds,
and constituents are encouraged to pressure their senators
one way or the other. Davis argues that the growing
politicization of the selection process has less to do with
ideological presidents or confrontational senators, and
more to do with the excesses of these new players. To that
end, the role of these new players, especially the public's,
ought to be recognized, legitimated, and regulated.
The book's next chapter provides a history of judicial
selection, demonstrating that it has always had a political element. Presidents choose meritorious candidates, but
they also choose candidates who mirror their personal ideology, who are personal friends, and who represent certain
ethnic, religious, or gender groups. Presidents' decisions
are further influenced by advisors, senators, and current
court members. The Senate's reaction to nominees is influenced by its partisanship, its relationship with the president, the timing of the nomination, and the nominee him/
herself. What is most noteworthy, Davis demonstrates, is
that the time required for confirmation of nominees has
markedly increased in the last thirty years.
In chapter three, Davis argues that the conditions for a
more public, protracted, and altogether broken court selection process were in place by the Reagan administration.
Congress was resurgent, the Supreme Court was fresh off
many policy-making decisions involving salient issues
like abortion, school prayer, and racial integration, and the
media's resources and appetite had grown considerably.
While Robert H. Bork's Senate conflagration is typically
seen as a turning point, Davis argues, it is viewed as such
only because the conditions for it were set. Since Bark, the
incentives for expanding the fight have remained and so
wiIl the broken process.
Davis shows in chapter four how the new players affect judicial selection. First, are the interest groups. They
reinforce the concept of "litmus tests" for nominees and
lobby senators; more powerfully, though, they have become institutionalized in the selection process, with group
representatives testifying during hearings. The press scrutinizes candidates, often doggedly, and revs up public
interest in nominees. Whether rightfully or not, the press
fain plays up the drama of judicial selection. Finally, the
public is playing a larger role in the process, even though
the Constitution's original intent specifically prohibited it.
Public opinion poIling and its consequent leverage has its
influence on the Senate.
Given the influence of public opinion, the White House,
Senate, and interest groups all labor to create a suitable image of each nominee. The presidency has the advantage of
surprise in announcing a nominee, but opposition groups
quickly marshal their opposition. Then, the battle for the
identity of the candidate is waged through the media. Sometimes, the White House wins, for example, when it successfully sold Clarence Thomas as a rags-to-riches personifi60

cation of the "American Dream." Other times, opposition
forces win, such as, when the public became convinced that
Bork truly was out of the mainstream. In either case, the
media can be relied upon to foment the conflict.
After tracing the history and current problems of the
selection process, Davis offers bold recommendations
to repair it. He scolds presidents for nominating justices
according to certain political or ideological themes; he
scolds the Senate for treating confirmation hearings as
high theatre rather than serious deliberation; and he scolds
nominees for being less-than forthright in their testimonies.
However innocuous, his strongest reform is for the public:
"Since ... the public already is involved as a player, one
possible reform is to formalize that involvement by allowing
the public to participate in the selection of justices."3 He
suggests term limits and the regular election of new justices
by a plebiscite of nominees already confirmed by the Senate,
competitive election among potential nominees submitted
by the president. or by other limited means. He submits the
democratizing trend of American politics and the election
of state justices as powerfill precedent. Whether or not one
agrees with his proposal, his argument in this chapter is
careful and serious.

Evaluation of Methodology
Systematic study of the Supreme Court is difficult for
one overwhelming reason: a small sample size. That is,
with the court only rotating in a new justice every two
years, on average, it is challenging to develop models
that both explain and predict the behavior of presidents,
Congress, nominees, and extra-constitutional players,
simply because there are few real world observations to
base those models upon. From the court's inception, in
1789, to the present day, only 110 justices have occupied its
bench (108 at the time Electing Justice was written). This
contrasts starkly with the data available to congressional
scholars, who have 535 members to observe, with many
of them changing every two years. It is in even greater
contrast with behavioral political scientists or pollsters
who typically judge one thousand as the magic number of
observations necessary for analysis.
As Davis's observations are truncated in quantity, they
are also elongated in time, further compounding difficulty.
He argues that there has been a fundamental shift in the role
of public opinion, media, and interest groups in the selection process over the last quarter-century. Yet, his argument
must be based on only a few select instances, specifically,
the nomination of William Rehnquist to chief justice and
the subsequent confirmation battles from Antonin Scalia to
Stephen Breyer. Thus, the number of relevant observations
to Davis's argument is exceptionally small.
To address this problem, Davis first expands the study
by, in the words of Robert A. Dahl, "quantifying when
he can and qualifying when he must." Davis produces
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convincing figures that something truly has broken in
the Supreme Court nomination process: the nomination
process takes significantly longer, nominations are
featured more often in major print and television media,
and opposition groups are featured more prominently in
those media spots. Electing Justice is a slim volume, and
it could benefit from additional quantitative information.
Specifically, he tracks the growing influence of the media,
but few numbers are given to support the assertion that
interest groups and the public are becoming increasingly
involved. Have senators actually received more constituent
calls regarding nominations since the 1970s? Have groups
poured more money into the fight? Data on these and
similar questions would be an improvement.
Although Davis does not expand on quantitative
information, he does assemble his qualitative evidence
nicely. His particular gift for narrative shines as his
volume seamlessly incorporates anecdotes, news reports,
scholarly assessments, and expert opinion. Together, this
forms a comprehensive account of the last thirty years
of Supreme Court selections, and every relevant detail is
included. In the book's acknowledgements, he includes
his debt to several current justices, senators, and officials
for their interviews and candor.
While Davis assembles his observations well, his explanation falls short. Electing Justice's theoretical underpinnings are underdeveloped, and the main causal mechanism
he uses to explain the increasingly participatory nature of
the Supreme Court selection process is inadequate. While
reasonable, its explanatory power is limited. Given the incentives for increased participation, why was the fight not
joined until roughly the 1970s? And if appeals to a larger
group increase an interest's chance of success, why do politicians more often decry the politicization of the process
rather than embrace it? And given the theory's suggestion
that the conflicts will inevitably increase in size, then why
have some later confirmations, such as those of Ruth Ginsburg and Breyer, been relatively quiet?
This criticism of theory is a minor complaint. The
organization of the book does clearly layout what has
happened to the selection process, and why it is of a lesser
concern. Again and again, and impressively, Davis iterates
that it did happen, and fixing the process is his point.

Justice by Consent?
Electing Justice's argument leaves the reader either
sharply opposed or vigorously supportive. Its central
premise-the current judicial selection system is essentially participatory for all but the electorate-cannot be
denied prima facie. However, its central conclusion-the
government ought to legitimate the electorate by including it in the selection system-can be.
Davis deserves credit for advancing a controversial
idea. He deserves even more credit for suggesting

proposals that are altogether serious. It would be far
more incredulous than bold for Davis to call for open,
presidential-style elections of Supreme Court Justices.
Thus, his courage lies in the modest reforms he advances.
They are compelling-perhaps, dangerous to some
minds-because they are realistic.
Nonetheless, I remain unconvinced. Given the
evidence the book brings forward, there is little reason
to believe that more fully including citizens in judicial
selection will alleviate its current politicization, nor is
there assurance that electing the Supreme Court would not
bring problems worse than those of the current system.
In the initial moment, it seems the election route is a
bow to reality, a giving up. The book argues that, in regard
to the unprecedented media and interest group attention
given to judicial nominees since the 1970s, the "genie cannot be put back in the bottle." Maybe it cannot, but is the
only option total acquiescence? Instead, I would suggest
that much of the furor of recent confirmations is less because of the media's growing appetite-though it is substantial and has substantially affected all three branches
of government-and is more a consequence of an overly
ambitious late twentieth century Court, particularly during
the Thomas Berger years.
It is difficult to study the Supreme Court in this sense
because its members change at a glacial pace. Nonetheless,
it is indisputable that the Court's sweeping reforms in the
1960s and 1970s, and incremental reverses from the 1980s
through 2007, have raised the profile of the Court in the
public consciousness. The strongest example of this is Roe
v. Wade. Unlike many other decisions, such as Brown v.
Board or Gideon v. Wainwright, which were controversial
at their time but have since become accepted, Roe v. Wade
remains stubbornly unresolved, a fifty-fifty issue in 1973
and a fifty-fifty issue in 2007. Abortion has become the de
facto judicial litmus test, evidenced well enough by Electing
Justice's compilation of most-quoted interest groups during
confirmation hearings: NARAL, Planned Parenthood, and
National Right to Life are three of the top five. Abortion
has drawn millions of-probably-previously apathetic
citizens into the Supreme Court debate.
The activist Court of the 1960s and 1970s drew
further attention from citizens as it struck other previously
unmolested nerves: affirmative action, flag burning, and
student rights. So many decisions, handed down then
to protests and cheers, remain raw wounds or protected
treasures to differing groups. Conciliation has not
occurred, so the Court's stakes remain high. Thus, the
public has primed the media for increased attention to
judicial confirmations, not the other way around.
Democratization of the Supreme Court, whether by
one of the modes suggested by Davis or another, is an attractive alleviant, particularly to those who feel they have
been ill-served by the Supreme Court. Election dynamics
61
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suggest that presidents would be forced to nominate centrist rather than ideological nominees. Therefore, the logic
goes, the Supreme Court will not make polarizing decisions,
and the people will finally get the decisions from the Court
that they wanted all along. The public will be pleased further
as its role in the process is legitimated, in contrast to today,
where the public influences judicial selection only indirectly
through senatorial pressure and interest group leverage. In
short, public empowerment will cleanse both the selection
process and the Supreme Court.
Unfortunately, democratizing the judicial selection
process will muddy the Supreme Court like nothing else.
Davis correctly notes that the selection process does
"have all the trappings of an electoral campaign,"4 but
sloganeering and stump speeches alone do not democracy
make. The whole point of the "trappings" is to advertise
the consequences of an official's election or rejection.
There is no election without expectation.
And what would expectation mean for an elected
Supreme Court? Why, just what its agitators on the right
and left want-a Court of preclusion, one that has made its
rulings before taking the bench. In this Court, the public's
desire is legitimated by its role as elector, and the added
pressure may force its justices to bow to opinion polls rather
than justice. The alternative is for the Court to alienate the
public to a degree it could not without election, which would
result in more polarization, more rancor, and more power
to special interests. Electing Justice says much about a
judiciary that is both accountable and independent. I cannot
see these two ideals as anything but contradictory.

Conclusion
Electing Justice is a fabulous history, studious, incisive, well-documented, and refreshing. Davis deserves
tremendous credit for shedding light on how the Supreme
Court selection process has changed and for proposing a
remedy to its current system.
The book's most valuable use may be as a guide to the
future. The nomination and confirmation battles of Justices
John Roberts and Samuel Alito fit the book's models extremely well and confirm the permanent and powerful role
of the media, interest groups, and the public in the selection process. A second edition of the volume accounting
for these two selections would be most welcome. As the
Court's recent rulings on school integration, campaign advertising, and other issues demonstrate, the judicial branch
is alive, well, and as powerful as ever. Davis's work is a
valuable contribution to understanding the judicial branch's
power and to encouraging its proper use.
NOTES
I. Davis. Richard. Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Courl
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